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Abstract: Inheritance taxation divides public opinion and is among the most unpopular taxes in 
many countries, although only a minority of people have to pay it. Using a survey experiment with 
vignettes on a sample of German citizens (N=479), we examine attitudes towards inheritance 
taxation. Our results reveal several relevant dimensions for a proposed fair inheritance tax rate 
(PITR): The PITR decreases with a close relationship between testator and heir and when the asset 
is a family-occupied house or family enterprise compared with a “lump sum”. It increases with the 
value of bequest and income of the heir representing equity considerations. Respondents advocate 
higher tax rates to reduce fiscal budget deficits. Respondents with a strong family orientation 
propose a low inheritance tax rate. 
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Transfer taxes on bequests and gifts are one possible instrument to mitigate wealth concentration 
through a redistribution of wealth and income (redistribution function).1 However, although only a 
minority of people have to pay inheritance taxes, the inheritance taxation divides public opinion and 
is among the most unpopular taxes in many countries.  
Our study analyses via an experimental design which factors are considered relevant by 
laypeople for inheritance tax rates and which respondent characteristics explain a general tendency 
to favor high or low inheritance tax rates. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, our 
results contradict previous findings and show that inheritance taxation as such is accepted by a large 
majority of the respondents of our survey. We deviate from former surveys by allowing for a 
continuous response (i.e., the selection of a specific tax rate) instead of a binary (dis)approval of the 
tax. We believe this approach to be more appropriate since the respondents are forced to reflect on 
the question more deeply.2 Second, we argue that attitudes towards inheritance taxation are based on 
different preferences for redistribution. Theoretical and empirical research has identified self-
interest, social justice and fairness considerations, social values, and social mobility as main 
influences for differences in preferences for redistribution (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2005; Durante and Putterman, 2007). In order to explain different attitudes towards 
inheritance taxation, we consider the first three factors to be the most important. 
Survey experiments using vignettes (i.e., factorial survey experiments) combine the advantages 
both of surveys and those of experiments. Internal validity can be increased by the integration of 
experiments and by “avoiding the shortcoming of unidimensional stimuli” (Auspurg and Hinz, 2015, 
p. 10), while external validity (which is usually low within experiments) can be increased by using 
random or at least more heterogeneous samples (as opposed to using only students, as is done in 
                                            
1 In standard textbooks, two additional functions are ascribed to taxes: financing the public budget (fiscal 
function) and correcting externalities (i.e., Pigouvian tax) (Kaplow, 2007). This paper is focused on the 
redistribution function. 
2 It can be argued that this approach might force the respondents to choose a non-zero answer and therefore 
overestimates the support for inheritance taxation. However, choosing a tax rate of zero was an obvious 
option, and we still observe variance within the respondent, which allows for interpreting the causal 
mechanisms and implies that there is prevalent support for non-zero tax rates.  
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most of the laboratory research) (Mutz 2011, Auspurg and Hinz 2015). Factorial survey experiments 
are widely used in sociology to analyze beliefs and judgements, especially on norms and justice but 
also for behavioral studies on moving or job decicions (see Wallander, 2009 for a review on the 
application of factorial surveys).  
Applying a survey experiment using vignettes, we are able to disentangle the causal effects of 
self-interest motives (expecting bequest), fairness considerations (heir’s income, value of bequest), 
and social values, especially family-based values (relationship of heir to bequeather, type of bequest), 
on the selection of a fair tax rate. Additionally, we include governmental debt as a measure signaling 
the financial needs of the public budget. The cumulative advantage of having already-high earnings 
and receiving bequests in addition might be considered unfair. Based on vertical equity arguments, 
we predict that respondents support a progressive tax schedule that increases with the value of the 
bequest and emphasizes ability-to-pay principles. The family-based argument concentrates on the 
character of the inheritance as taxable transfer. Whether intra-family bequests should be regarded as 
taxable transactions is debatable. This argument is supported by societal values that consider the 
family to be a unit of care and that supports its members and society as a whole. 
Regarding Germany, polls show a slight majority opposing inheritance taxes. According to 
Schrenker and Wegener (2007), 52% of respondents would appreciate a repeal of the inheritance tax. 
This is in line with the results of Lettke (2004), who also finds that 58% of respondents oppose the 
inheritance tax. Similar opinions are expressed in other countries. For example, Moon (2009) finds 
that 67% of respondents in the US favor the elimination of estate taxes. He finds that the supporters 
of the elimination are mainly older, are married, and have a yearly income above $ 75,000. 
Unfortunately, no demographic information of opponents of the tax is available for Germany. These 
rates of rejection of the tax can be seen as a surprising result considering the fact that only a small 
fraction of people will be liable to inheritance taxation. Consequently, the total revenue of the 
German inheritance tax measured as a share of total tax revenue falls short compared with other 
German taxes, such as income tax or sales tax (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2014), and the 
revenue of the inheritance tax in Germany is quite low in international comparison (OECD, 2014). 
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Supporters of estate taxes highlight the redistributive character of a progressive estate tax on 
“unearned” bequests that effects only a small part of the population and can strengthen equality of 
opportunity. Opponents of estate taxes mention double-taxation, harmful effects on small and family 
businesses, and the time at which it is imposed (for a discussion of arguments see, e.g., Gale and 
Slemrod, 2001; Graetz and Shapiro, 2011; Prabhakar, 2008; Prabhakar et al., 2008). Whether 
people’s preferences and attitudes towards taxes are mainly driven by narratives or other underlying 
factors, such as self-interest or fairness motives, remains an open question.  
Prabhakar (2008) argues that opponents of estate taxes provide stories and frames, which have 
been more persuasive than the collection of numbers and statistics provided by supporters of the tax. 
However, substantial opposition to estate taxes remains, even if appropriate frames are used 
(Prabhakar, 2008). It remains unclear whether these attitudes indicate a fundamental rejection of 
inheritance taxation as a matter of principle or only a rejection of specific tax legislation. These 
questions are only rarely addressed in research.  
Negative (context) effects of inequality have been shown for various dimensions of daily life, 
such as poor health, low human well-being, high crime rates, low social trust and cohesion, and high 
anxiety and stress levels (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). One key factor for the reproduction of social 
inequality is intergenerational transfers. Intergenerational transfers and the wealth distribution are 
clearly linked. Numerous studies show a positive intergenerational correlation of income and wealth 
and high values for the intergenerational elasticity of wealth (e.g., Solon, 1992, for the US; Clark and 
Cummins, 2015, for England). Consistent cross-country evidence is provided by Black and Devereux 
(2011) and Corak (2013). In addition to economic capital, further family background characteristics, 
such as education, health, and social behavior are also positively correlated across generations (see, 
e.g., Black and Devereux, 2011, for an overview). 
As mentioned by Black and Devereux (2011), intergenerational correlations are not 
questionable per se, and the “optimal” level of intergenerational mobility is unknown and depends on 
the underlying causes and determinants. Intergenerational immobility becomes problematic only if 
the principle of meritocratic societies (in which individual achievement should influence a person’s 
social status) is violated. Although the research on the underlying channels of wealth transmission 
has only just begun and is not yet conclusive, there is some evidence that wealth begets wealth, 
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independent of the inheritance of skills (see, e.g., Black et al. 2015). Moreover, as Corak (2013, p. 79) 
concludes, “an emerging body of evidence suggests that more inequality of incomes in the present is 
likely to make family background play a stronger role in determining the adult outcomes of young 
people, with their own hard work playing a commensurately weaker role.” 
We take these observations as a starting point in discussing attitudes towards inheritance 
taxation. Inheritance taxes can be considered a useful part of the overall tax system and policy tools 
if the redistribution of wealth is a desired goal. In addition to revenue needs, the reduction of 
economic immobility is, in fact, one of the most important justifications for inheritance taxation. In 
the same vein, legal literature in favor of inheritance taxes proposes equality of opportunity or 
resource equality as a guiding principle. This means that each member of society should begin life 
with similar resources and life chances (Alstott, 2007). However, both the chances of receiving a 
bequest and the value of the inheritance increase with the previous wealth and income of the heir, 
which leads to an accumulation of capital in these families, as is shown for Germany (Szydlik, 2004) 
and further European countries (Albertini and Radl, 2012). 
In Section 2, key elements of the German inheritance tax and a comparison of international 
inheritance and estate tax regulations are given. Section 3 provides both the major arguments from 
which we derive our hypotheses as well as the dimensions that matter in explaining the attitudes 
towards a fair inheritance tax rate. In Section 4, the survey experiment, the dataset, and the methods 
for analyzing it are introduced and described. The last two sections provide and discuss the results 
(5) and concluding remarks (6). 
2. Background knowledge about inheritance taxation – Germany in international comparison 
This section first provides a brief institutional overview of inheritance tax design in Germany. 
Second, differences and similarities of inheritance taxation in selected industrialized countries are 
pointed out. There are two different concepts of intergenerational transfer taxation (see Cremer and 
Pestieau, 2006; Gale and Slemrod, 2001): Estate taxes are levied on the total bequest of the testator, 
whereas inheritance taxes are levied on the share received by the recipients. Most OECD countries, 
including Germany, impose inheritance taxes. In most countries, transfers causa mortis and transfers 
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inter vivos are treated almost identically and laid down in the same tax code to reduce tax avoidance 
activities.  
<<  Table 1 here  >> 
 
Inheritance tax design allows for the application of different tax rates and allowances linked to 
certain characteristics of the beneficiaries. A strong preference to relieve close family members can 
be observed in all countries (see Table 1). For the case of Germany, the degree of kinship is taken 
into account, and allowances and tax rates differ according to three tax classes. Moreover, children 
of the deceased person are granted an additional pension allowance, which depends on and decreases 
with age (ErbStG, §17).  
In Germany, tax rates vary depending on the volume of bequest from between 7% and 30% in 
Tax Class I (e.g., father, grandfather), between 15% and 43% in Tax Class II (e.g., uncle), and 
between 30% and 50% in Tax Class III (e.g., non-relatives). A progressive tax schedule is 
implemented in most countries. In the US, the current estate tax is effectively a flat tax for estates 
subject to it. In Switzerland, most bequests are untaxed because spouses and decedents are tax-
exempt in almost all cantons.  
Substantial tax allowances for transfers of companies are granted. Some conditions, such as the 
continuation of business and thresholds for the increase in the sum of salaries, are required in the tax 
code. However, the regulations entail the tradeoff between the protection of businesses to continue 
their economic activity (prevent potential job losses) and fairness considerations (equal burden of 
similar assets). Although decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2006 and the 
Federal Fiscal Court in 2009 support the privileged taxation of certain assets if this is in the public 
interest, such privileges must be well justified and should not be implemented through tax valuation 
procedures (Houben and Maiterth, 2009). Thus, the German inheritance tax law remains in flux. 
Houben and Maiterth (2009) provide a more detailed overview on the inheritance tax exemptions of 
German businesses. Further exemptions apply to owner-occupied property. A variety of additional 
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exemptions, allowances, and valuation rules exists; however, the study at hand is focused on the 
above-mentioned dimensions. 
Inheritance taxes are usually more tailored towards certain groups of beneficiaries, i.e., those 
providing different tax classes depending on kinship. However, similar exemptions and exclusions 
are also applied in estate tax systems. The US, for example, allows extra deductions for transfers to 
surviving spouses or for the transfer of family businesses (see Gale and Slemrod, 2001; US Tax 
Code). Although the tax base and subject are determined differently, it is clear that similar 
dimensions are incorporated in international inheritance and estate tax design. 
3. The inheritance tax rate and preferences for redistribution 
Four main approaches have been found to explain different support for redistribution: self-interest, 
social justice and fairness, social values and norms, and social mobility. A comprehensive overview of 
preferences for redistribution is given by Alesina and Giuliano (2011). They highlight the own 
position on the income ladder among other personal characteristics as well as fairness considerations 
as being important factors in shaping attitudes towards redistribution. Jaime-Castillo and Sáez-
Lozano (2014) highlight self-interest and political ideology as the driving forces in explaining 
preferences for redistribution. 
We concentrate on self-interest, fairness considerations, and family values as we consider them 
to be appropriate and most important in the context of redistribution through inheritance taxation. 
We add the size of the public budget deficit as a further channel that might explain differing 
attitudes towards taxation. In the following sections, the guiding hypotheses3 are derived. 
                                            
3 The hypotheses are named according to the data level they refer to: R(espondent) hypotheses are based on 




3.1 The role of self-interest 
Self-interest is one of the main explanations for different preferences for redistribution (e.g., 
Rutström and Williams, 2000). The distinction of individuals in beneficiaries or taxpayers in the case 
of inheritance taxation depends on the individuals’ prospect of receiving an inheritance. Respondents 
should propose high tax rates if they do not expect to receive taxable bequests or gifts, and vice 
versa. A rational actor should support a high tax rate if he or she was not concerned by it in the past 
(and will not be in the future) because this actor could benefit from governmental redistribution 
without own monetary contributions: 
R1: The proposed fair inheritance tax rate is higher if the respondent is not expecting a bequest. 
3.2 Fairness Considerations 
The importance of fairness considerations can be seen in a study by Alesina, Cozzi, and Mantovan 
(2012). The authors study a political economy model to explain the evolution of differing preferences 
for redistribution at the country level and show that the perception of inequalities as either fair or 
unfair can lead to different steady states in tax policy. The same level of inequality might be 
considered fair if its underlying wealth has been accumulated through effort, whereas it might be 
considered unfair if it has been acquired solely by luck, illegal activities (such as corruption), or birth, 
as is the case with inheritances.4 Based on this differentiation of the source of income or wealth, a 
preference for redistributing inheritances through taxation can be expected, as is shown by 
Krawczyk (2010) in an experimental investigation. However, not only the inequalities themselves, 
but also the redistributional mechanism (through tax policy) to resolve them needs to be justified 
based on fairness principles in order to gain acceptance.  
In tax design, vertical and horizontal equity principles are considered to incorporate general 
notions of fairness based on differences in ability to pay (see Kaplow, 2007). A properly designed 
                                            
4  An often-mentioned argument disagrees with the notion of inheritances as based on birth and luck: 
Inheritances could be achieved through effort if one assumes the heir is recompensated for working in a family 
business or for providing care for the bequeather. However, different perceptions of (un)deserved inheritances 
should alter only the intercept but not the marginal effects of income and inheritance value.  
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inheritance tax could be a potentially useful instrument to redistribute and foster an equality of 
opportunities. Focusing on equity considerations, people with different initial income situations 
could be taxed differently because the income of the heir can be considered an indicator for his or her 
inherent ability rather than merely for economic capital (see, i.e., Mankiw et al., 2009). People with 
higher inherent abilities are able to pay more taxes than people with lower inherent abilities. In 
addition, a high-income earner is regarded as less needy than a low-income earner. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
V1: The proposed inheritance tax rate increases with the heir’s income. 
We hypothesize that the fairness principles also need to be reflected in the inheritance tax 
schedule to gain acceptance by taxpayers. Applying the vertical equity principle, people who receive 
a bequest of higher value would have to hand over a larger part of their bequest to the state. 
Although the desired level of progressivity remains an empirical question and is answered in the 
empirical part of this text, we expect that: 
V2: The proposed inheritance tax rate increases with the value of bequest. 
3.3 Family values 
Most bequests and inter-vivos transfers take place between family members, so it is important to 
take a closer look at values and norms that consider the family as well as the family-state relation 
when explaining differences in redistribution preferences. In Germany in 2013, about 63% of all 
taxable transfers (tax cases) – gifts and bequests – were transferred within the family. This number 
would have been even higher if transfers to non-private organizations and charities had been able to 
be excluded from the remaining 37%. Moreover, 82% of the total value of these tax cases is 
transferred among family members (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014). The notion of bequests and 
inter-vivos gifts within the family as taxable transfers, however, is controversial. If the family is seen 
as a unit and a collective actor and not the individual family member itself, the bequest would not be 
considered a transfer and should therefore not be taxed.  
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Bengtson (2001) provides arguments for the “increasing importance of multigenerational (three 
or more) relationships for well-being and support over the course of their lives.” A generational 
contract exists that obligates family members not only legally but also socially to support other 
members, especially in times of need (Albertini et al., 2007). “The family is […] one of the key 
institution for transmitting assets, knowledge, and values across generations […]” (Alstott, 2009, 
p. 124). Furthermore, families are seen as and often act as collectives (Bourdieu, 1996). Resources 
may be pooled within families, and the property of individual family members may not be considered 
individual property, but rather “family property” (Beckert, 2008). Families are already treated 
differently in tax law (e.g., through joint income taxation for spouses or exemptions for children), 
emphasizing the importance and identity ascribed to family and the interpretation of family as a 
collective unit. Furthermore, even if family ideals do not exclude inheritance taxation per se (Alstott, 
2009), conservative as well as functional ideals of families would require a special treatment of 
families by leaving wealth within the family. Both ideals lead to the belief in the family as a main 
institution for support within its members and in family property as a resource for this support. 
Inheritance taxation interferes with these resources, and bequests within the family institution 
should be protected in the form of low tax rates or exemptions. In consideration of the family 
principle, the relationship between testator and heir should impact the perception of a fair tax rate.  
V3: The proposed inheritance tax rate increases with decreasing closeness in the relationship 
between testator and heir. 
This idea holds true even more if the asset represents family wealth, as is the case for owner-
occupied property or the family enterprise. In addition to the monetary value, both assets can have 
psychological or emotional value for the bequeather and the heir. The family home can hold 
memories of the deceased person and the heir’s childhood, as can the family enterprise. People 
ascribe different meanings to bequeathed objects that can hardly be standardized and converted to 
money (Stum, 2000). A family home or family enterprise could be inherited by a group of heirs, e.g., 
siblings. In this case, a division of the inherited asset is often not possible or only possible at high 
costs. Family enterprises are burdened with the maintenance of their business and the protection of 
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jobs while meeting their tax obligations. Therefore, the asset itself should affect the perceived fair 
tax rate. 
V4: The proposed inheritance tax rate is higher if the type of bequest is a “lump sum” compared 
with owner-occupied property or a family enterprise.  
In addition, there are personal characteristics at the respondent level that can have an effect on 
proposed tax rates. Independent of the inheritance case per se, people who support family-oriented 
values might consider inheritance taxation to be illegitimate state interference. The family is valued 
as the higher authority compared with the state, and intra-familiar support is preferred over the 
government in situations where redistribution decisions are made.  
R2: The proposed inheritance tax rate increases with decreasing family-orientation of the 
respondent. 
3.4 Governmental debt and inheritance taxation 
In addition to the already-defined factors influencing redistribution preferences, we take 
governmental debt into account. The relationship between public spending and revenue raising 
comprises one of the fundamental concerns in public finance literature. Musgrave (1969, p.797) 
summarizes the issue as follows: “A theory of public finance remains unsatisfactory unless it 
comprises both the revenue and expenditure sides of the fiscal process.” However, in practice, both 
topics are often discussed independently. Therefore, we include a simple expenditure side-measure 
while focusing on the acceptance of the inheritance tax. Respondents can adjust their proposed tax 
rate depending on the level of governmental debt. We consider it necessary to include the 
expenditure side because any survey in which people can decide on their tax rate will presumably be 
biased towards the lower bound. Including a measure for public spending raises awareness that taxes 
are used to finance public goods. As experimental evidence by Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) 
shows, people do not pay taxes merely to comply with tax laws, but rather, they value the public 
goods that can be financed through taxation. We include governmental debt because it entails the 
whole budget and is therefore less vulnerable to different preferences in budget composition. 
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High public debt signals a stronger need for tax revenue, as is the case in situations with well-
off finances. The higher need might justify higher tax rates and could alter the willingness to pay 
higher taxes in order to improve the fiscal situation. We therefore hypothesize:  
V5: The proposed inheritance tax rate is higher if governmental debt is high. 
However, taxpayers could also perceive high debt as a signal for weak governmental 
performance, which would presumably decrease their willingness to pay high taxes. In the context of 
tax compliance, it has been shown that public spending inefficiencies weaken tax morale (Barone and 
Mocetti, 2011). Thus, a higher governmental debt could, ceteris paribus, also decrease the proposed 
inheritance tax rate. Whether the inefficiency explanation or the revenue-need explanation 
dominates is tested in the empirical part. 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1. Study design 
Respondents were sampled from an online access opt-in-panel, the WiSo-Panel, with approximately 
10,000 participants (Effective October 2011) that was run at the University of Freiburg in Germany 
(Göritz, 2014). In online access opt-in panels, interested people can sign up for participation in online 
surveys. As long as they choose to participate in the panel, they receive invitations to answer 
surveys. The WiSo-Panel is used only for scientific purposes and non-commercial research. Panelists 
were 40 years old on average, and 62% were female. Most of them lived in Germany (95%). The 
panelists’ educational backgrounds were slightly more advanced than the German average. In 
September 2012, a random sample selection of these panelists (n = 2,022) were invited via email to 
participate in an online survey that included a survey experiment with vignettes (see Section 4.2.). 
The invitation stated the general topic as well as the expected response time of the survey. 
Respondents participated voluntarily and were remunerated for completing surveys. 479 people 
answered the survey, yielding a response rate of 23.7%.  
Although our sample is more heterogeneous than in most laboratory experiments, the collected 
respondent data is not representative of the German population and effects concerning respondents’ 
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characteristics need to be interpreted with care. Tests of external validity, e.g. by using other 
samples, are necessary to draw generalised conclusions. However, we are mainly interested in the 
causal effects of different treatments on respondents’ decisions. For this case, Auspurg and Hinz 
(2015: 62) postulate that “the validity of (FS) experiments does not necessarily rely on the use of 
general population samples. In cases in which one wishes to test causal mechanisms, this goal can be 
achieved with convenience samples […] Problems of generalizability to other respondent samples 
arise, however, if these mechanisms are moderated by the respondents’ characteristics (i.e., if there 
are interactions between respondent variables and vignette variables).” We have tested several 
theory-driven interaction effects between respondent and vignette variables and have not detected 
one significant (cross-level) interaction effect, which can be seen as an indicator for not having a 
problem with the generalisability of the vignette effects. However, we cannot completely invalidate 
the issue.  
The respondent sample is described in Table 2. The net household income (in €) has been 
logarithmized to meet the requirement of normal distribution. These sociodemographic variables are 
controlled for in the models in Table 5, while the following two variables concern the hypotheses on 
respondent level (R1 and R2): 29% of respondents expect a bequest of more than € 25,000 in the 
future. The metric index of family orientation,5 with 1 indicating a high family orientation and 
strong intra-familiar support values, has an average value of .69.  
 
<<  Table 2 here  >> 
 
We have three different types of data: 
                                            
5  0-1 standardized index generated from the question “How much do you agree with the following 
statements?” and the four statements “Relatives should support each other like the older generation used to do. 
You should support those relatives who are worse off than you. You do not have to support those relatives you 
do not like. The relatives you support should sooner or later give their assistance in return.” Although these 
questions adapted from Gerlitz (2008) are not optimal, we decided to use them instead of developing a new 
scale (answer categories: completely agree, agree, not agree, completely disagree). 
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(1) Basic information among the respondents, such as gender or age, which was provided 
by the access panel and contains no missing data. 
(2) Respondent data collected in our online survey, including information about the 
educational background, household income, and family orientation of the respondent, and 
whether the respondent him- or herself is expecting a bequest. Missing values within these 
data are treated by single imputations since only one value is missing among the variables 
needed for hypothesis testing. The other variables serve as control variables. The slightly 
underestimated standard errors of the control variables due to single imputation (rather than 
multiple imputation) are not reported, nor do they affect the coefficients and standard errors of 
the variables tested within the hypotheses. The imputation model for net household income 
with the highest share of missing values (4.8%) includes gender, age, and educational 
background.  
(3) Vignette judgments per respondent are described in the next section (4.2.) and do not 
contain any missing data. 
4.2. Survey experiments with vignettes 
Survey experiments using vignettes are an experimental method often used to examine attitudes, 
beliefs, and judgements (Alves and Rossi, 1978; Jasso and Opp, 1997; Ellmann, 2009). Vignettes are 
short descriptions of people or situations with varying dimensions (treatments). As each respondent 
has to give several vignette judgments, the impact of each dimension on the vignette judgment 
(dependent variable) can be estimated. The main advantages of this method are (a) the experimental 
design, which allows for a causal interpretation of the effects; (b) a concrete situation, which is more 
realistic for the respondents than an abstract question; and (c) a social desirability bias that is almost 
fixed because several dimensions are being judged in common (for a comprehensive overview on 
survey experiments with vignettes see Auspurg and Hinz, 2015).  
We constructed vignettes with varying cases of inheritance (see Figure 1 for an example) to 
examine which of the given dimensions are seen as relevant for a proposed inheritance tax rate 
(PITR). The PITR can be regarded as a measure of revealed preferences for redistribution. The 
varying dimensions are written in bold and include the heir’s gender and monthly gross income, the 
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value of the heritage, the type of bequest, the relation between testator and heir, and the 
governmental debt of the country in which they live. We have no hypothesis concerning the impact 
of gender, but we followed the idea of using both gender categories for the heir (to avoid the 
impression of being male- or female-dominated) and only one gender for the bequeather (father, 
grandfather, uncle) to avoid receiving an additional dimension. 
 
<<  Figure 1 here  >> 
 
We included six dimensions, which are displayed in Table 3. Each dimension has several 
categories; in our study, we have 2 x 2 x 3 x 5 x 3 x 4 = 720 vignette options, which are called the 
vignette universe. After the exclusion of 4 implausible combinations,6 716 vignettes remained. A 
sample of 480 vignettes was drawn randomly and assigned to sets of six. Therefore, each respondent 
answered six vignettes, and each set was assigned to six respondents. Literature on methodological 
aspects of vignette use show that six vignettes are reasonable and do not prompt fatigue or overload 
for the respondents. Sauer et al. (2011) show that even 20 or more vignettes are manageable by 
respondents without any decrease in answer consistency. Teti et al. (2016) show no effect of age on 
answer consistency, even for respondents aged 70 and older with 10 vignettes.  
Respondents were allowed to browse back and forth between the vignettes and to change their 
judgements to minimize order effects. We also tested for order effects by including the first vignette 
by respondents only and received robust results concerning the coefficients while the standard errors 
strongly increased due to a loss of 5/6 of the cases. With 479 respondents and six vignettes each, we 
obtained 2,874 vignettes. Table 4 shows the distribution of the vignette characteristics. The 
distribution is not completely rectangular due to the exclusion of implausible combinations. 
However, there are no significant correlations between dimensions, which suggests a successful 
randomization. 
 
                                            
6 These were friend and family enterprise, family enterprise with value of € 25,000 and € 100,000, and owner-
occupied property with value of € 25,000. 
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<<  Table 3 here  >> 
<<  Table 4 here  >> 
 
The dependent variable (proposed inheritance tax rate in percent, PITR) was displayed on a 
scale from 0% to 100%, with 5-percent steps resulting in 21 possible values. This variable is 
interpreted as being metric and has an empirical range in our study from 0 to 100.7 The average 
PITR was 16.4% with a standard deviation of 17.0. Only 6% of the respondents proposed an 
inheritance tax rate of 0% across all six vignettes. These cases are included in the hierarchical linear 
models to avoid biased level-two effects. Although the dependent variable is far from being normally 
distributed (see Figure 2), we decided not to use the logarithmized value for the analysis since the 
basic results do not differ between the two versions (standard value in % versus logarithmized value) 
and the standard value allows for a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients. The values of 
the vignette dimensions are not completely randomly distributed since we excluded some unrealistic 
combinations (see Fn 6). Therefore, the distribution is not rectangular in some dimensions. 
Additionally, not all invited participants finished the questionnaire, and some vignettes were thereby 
not answered. 
 
<<  Figure 2 here  >> 
 
4.3. Data Analysis 
Data gathered via survey experiments using vignettes is hierarchically nested since several vignette 
judgments (in our case, six) were given by the same respondent. To account for this data structure, 
we applied multi-level analysis using HLM version 6 software (Raudenbush et al., 2004). Auspurg 
and Hinz (2015, p. 91) strongly recommend using random-intercept models with fixed slopes on data 
collected via factorial survey experiments if researchers’ main interest is the detection of vignette 
effects rather than the detection of respondent effects and random-intercept models are an adequate 
                                            
7 The metric scale may cause respondents to vary their vignette judgements, whereas they would tend to say 
no to the tax within a binary scale. This could be examined in future research. 
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and parsimonious solution in doing so. It is critical to note that both random-intercept and random-
slope models are both also known as random effect models (compared with fixed-effects models). As 
the coefficients of models with additional random slopes do not vary significantly from those of 
random-intercept models (deviance test8), we decided on the more simple random-intercept model 
that is presented in the following. With j = 1, …, N groups (respondents) and i = 1, …, N 










'heir_gender +  .         (1) 
 
The Level 2 model is  

 = ( + (expect_bequest + (family_oriented +	(
, - + . and  

 = (	, 
 = (	, 
 = (	, 
! = (!	, 
$ = ($	, 	
' = (' ,          (2) 
with X as a vector of additional control variables at the respondent level (e.g., gender, age). 
 
Following the linear mixed model can be defined as  
 = ( + (heir_inc01 +	(bequest_value01 +	(relation01 +	(!bequest_type01 +
		($gov_debt +	('heir_gender + (expect_bequest1 + (family_oriented1 +	(
, -1 +
. +	 .                 (3) 
Missing data on respondent levels were imputed as described in section 4.1 so that all models 
would contain the same cases. 
                                            
8 The deviance test (implemented in HLM) examines if the more complex model with random intercept and 
random slopes has a significantly better model fit than the more parsimonious model with random intercepts 
and fixed slopes. Since the deviance test is not significant, we decided on the parsimonious model. We also used 
the Hausman test (implemented in Stata), which tests for random versus fixed effects and confirms that it is 




The results of the random-intercept models that explain the PITR based on vignette characteristics 
(which describe a certain inheritance case) and respondent characteristics are displayed in Table 5. 
All independent variables are grand-mean centered; therefore, the intercept shows an average 
proposed inheritance tax rate of 16%. The unstandardized coefficients can be interpreted 
straightforwardly as absolute changes of the dependent variable. For example, if the heir’s monthly 
gross income is € 3,500, the PITR is 2.6 percentage points higher on average than for the reference 
category (€ 1,750 monthly gross income). 
 
<<  Table 5 here  >> 
 
The variances in the random-intercept-only model (RIO, not shown in tables) reveal an intra-
class correlation (ICC) of 65.0%, meaning that 65% of the overall variance is between respondents 
and the remaining 35% is within respondents at the vignette level. 
Model 1 includes the vignette characteristics only. All vignette characteristics explain 22.6% of 
the error variance in Level 1 (measured by the reduction of error variance compared with the 
random-intercept-only model). All hypotheses at the vignette level (V1–V5) are supported 
significantly: As already mentioned, the PITR is higher when the heir’s monthly gross income is 
higher, an effect that is even stronger for the highest income category of € 10,000, which affects a 
PITR that is 7.0 percentage points higher (compared with the reference category of a € 1,750 
monthly gross income, which supports Hypothesis V1). The higher the value of the bequest, the 
higher the PITR is (which supports Hypothesis V2): With a € 10 million bequest, a PITR that is 9.4 
percentage points higher is proposed compared with a value of bequest at € 25,000. With a closer 
relationship between testator and heir (uncle/grandfather/father as compared with friend), a  
1.7-/2.3-/3.9-percentage-point lower inheritance tax rate is proposed (supporting Hypothesis V3). 
Additionally, an emotional value of the bequest leads to a PITR that is reduced by 4.1 and 2.1 
percentage points regarding family-enterprise and owner-occupied property, respectively (which 
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supports Hypothesis V4). If governmental debt is high, the PITR is 1.6 percentage points lower 
(compared with a case with low governmental debt). The heir’s gender variation in the vignette text 
has no effect on the PITR. 
Model 2 additionally includes respondent characteristics that test Hypotheses R1 and R2. 
Respondents who themselves expect a heritage in the future do not propose a lower inheritance tax 
rate (which contradicts Hypothesis R1). Since previous research shows that expecting a bequest is 
correlated with a high income, we also tested the hypothesis using only the respondents’ income. 
The results remain robust and contradict the self-interest hypothesis. The higher the respondent’s 
family orientation is, the lower the PITR is (which supports Hypothesis R2). However, only a small 
share of 2.2% for the variance between respondents can be explained by respondent characteristics. 
We calculate the true tax liability for selected cases to contrast the judgments in the vignettes 
with real inheritance tax cases (see Table 6). Bequests in Tax Class I (from father and grandfather) 
are tax free for the lower values (€ 25,000 and € 100,000), display relatively low tax rates for the 
mid-values (€ 500,000 and € 1,000,000), and display effective tax rates of 18.2% and 22.5% for the 
highest value of € 10 million. On average, the PITR rises from 12.6% for the lowest value to 22.0% 
for the highest value (bequest from a father). It seems that respondents do not account for tax 
exemptions in their judgments. Therefore, proposed rates are higher than effective tax rates for the 
lower values and become more equal to true tax liabilities for the higher values. Non-related heirs 
(e.g., bequest from a friend) face lower allowances and higher tax rates. Lump-sum bequests from 
friends are taxed at effective rates from 6.0% up to about 50% for the aforementioned bequest 
categories. Excluding the lowest value, the PITR are lower than effective tax rates for non-relatives. 
Considering the type of bequest, enterprises and properties are taxed at lower rates compared with 
lump-sum transfers because additional exemptions and valuation methods exist. The average PITR 
in the vignettes is consistently lower for these assets compared with a lump sum.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
Our study is the first to show via an experimental design which of the proposed dimensions are 
considered relevant by laypeople for inheritance tax rates. Additionally, we analyse which 
respondent characteristics affect the tendency to favor high or low inheritance tax rates. However, 
the focus of our work is on the situation in Germany and uses a rather specific sample, so respondent 
effects should be interpreted with caution. The causal effects of the dimensions on inheritance tax 
rates, however, may be considered relatively robust due to the experimental design and the effect of 
the vignette dimensions not being moderated by respondent characteristics. 
In our data we find that the perception of a fair inheritance tax rate depends on the heir’s 
income, the value of the bequest, the relationship between testator and heir, as well as the 
bequeathed asset itself and the governmental debt. A fair tax rate increases with a higher value of the 
bequest, the income of the heir, and governmental debt. This tax rate decreases with an increasing 
familial relationship between testator and heir and if the asset is a family-occupied house or family 
enterprise in contrast to “lump sum”. Inheritance tax design should therefore consider need-based, 
equity-based, and family-based dimensions in order to be perceived as fair.  
On the one hand, these results support the redistributional character of the inheritance tax as 
the heir’s financial situation is considered. On the other hand, the study emphasizes the importance 
of the family as a unit of wealth and property and a redistributing institution by itself. In contrast to 
other studies, we find general support for the inheritance tax in Germany, as 94% of all respondents 
proposed tax rates larger than zero on average. However, tax rates are suggested to be relatively 
low and highly-educated people who are more likely to support inheritance tax in general are 
slightly overrepresented within the sample.  
Our results suggest that the self-interest argument (respondents expecting a bequest) does not 
play a role in the proposed inheritance tax rate. This is a surprising result because self-interest 
motives have received great attention in the theoretical literature.  
We consider our results relevant for three issues in the broader context of taxation and 
inheritance taxation in particular. First, a fair tax can be considered a precondition for high tax 
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morale (Kirchler et al., 2008; Torgler et al., 2008; for a comprehensive overview on tax morale and 
tax compliance, see Torgler, 2002). Thus, knowledge about the dimensions that shape fairness 
perception helps us to understand and affect taxpayers’ compliance decisions. Second, although the 
monthly gross income of heirs does not play a role in inheritance taxation in Germany or in other 
countries, we find sizeable effects for income differences of heirs in the proposed inheritance tax rate. 
This finding is potentially interesting because it prompts a discussion of an integrated taxation of 
income and inheritances. Third, in our study, governmental debt served as a proxy for the need for 
tax revenue. Because governmental debt influences the perception of a fair tax rate, it could be 
argued that not only the need for revenue but also the fiscal usage of a tax is of importance to people 
and should be communicated transparently. 
Although survey experiments using vignettes allow for the analysis of several dimensions at a 
time, there are several additional dimensions that would be worth considering in future research. 
Future research may, for example, concentrate on other recipients of inheritances, including 
charitable donations, or the emotional/reciprocal relationship between the bequeather and 
bequeathed in addition to the presence of more than one heir. Conducting an international 
comparison and/or a larger representative sample would be interesting, especially considering 
different contextual and cultural values and norms that shape fairness perceptions and different 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: International comparison of inheritance tax laws 
 Country Tax rates Allowances Level of tax 
administration 
Estate Tax Great Britain 40%  
(36% if 10% of total 
bequest is donated to 
charity) 
General allowance of 
325,000 GBP (nil rate 
band); higher allowances 
for spouse and civil 
partner 
National 
USA 40%  Allowances for spouses 







Germany Marginal tax rates vary 
between 7 and 50% 
depending on total value 
of bequest and kinship 
 
Spouse, civil partner: € 
500,000; children: € 
400,000; grandchildren: 
€ 200,000; other people 
in Tax Class I: € 
100,000; people in Tax 








Denmark 15% on total value of 
bequest above allowance 
of 263,100 DKK; 
Additional 25% for non-
related heirs.  
Above 1,786,600 DKK: 
50%  




France Marginal tax rates vary 
between 5 and 55% 
depending on total value 
of bequest and kinship 
No tax for spouse or civil 
partner 
Allowance for disabled 




Spouse, civil partner, 
children  
10% up to 20% for 
acquisitions above € 
118,254; grandchildren 
18% up to 36% for 
acquisitions above € 
118,254; others 
30% up to 40% for 
acquisitions above 
€118,254 
No tax for donations to 
state or charities; spouse 
or civil partner: € 
616,880, deducting 50% 
of joint pensions 
entitlements; allowance 
for ill or disabled 
children, different 




Switzerland Different regulations 
depending on Canton 
Different regulations 







Australia (abolished in 1979), Austria (abolished in 2008), Canada (abolished in 1972) 




Table 2: Respondent sample 
 Cases Mean SD MIN MAX 
Respondent expecting bequest > € 25,000 (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
478 .29 .45 0 1 
Family-oriented (index; 1 = high, 0 = low) 479 .69 .19 0 1 
Gender (1 = male) 479 .40 .49 0 1 
Age (in years) 479 44.66 14.57 18 82 
Educational background 
 Low (Reference, ISCED 1, 2) 
 Medium (ISCED 3, 4) 

























Table 3: Vignette dimensions 
Dimension Categories # 
Heir’s monthly gross income € 1,750 / € 3,500 / € 10,000 3 
Value of bequest € 25,000 / € 100,000 / € 500,000 / € 1 Mio / € 10 Mio  5 
Relation between testator and heir Friend/uncle/grandfather/father 4 
Type of bequest Lump sum/owner-occupied property/family enterprise 3 
Governmental debt High/low 2 











Heir’s monthly gross income 











Value of bequest  
€ 25,000  
€ 100,000  
€ 500,000  
€ 1 Mio  





















































































Value of bequest (Ref.: € 25,000) 
€ 100,000  
€ 500,000  
€ 1 Mio  



































Governmental debt (1 = high) 1.63 (4.57)*** 1.61 (4.53)*** 
Heir’s gender (1 = male) –0.42 (–1.26) –0.42 (–1.26) 
Respondents (Level 2)   
Respondent expecting bequest  








Error variance Level 1 







Nl1_vignettes 2874 2874 
Nl2_respondents 479 479 
Deviance 21986.11 21955.02 
Independent variables are grand-mean centered. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, * p < .001 
Control variables on respondents’ level considered in model 2: gender, age, educational background and net household 




Table 6: True tax liability for selected cases 
The effective tax rates are calculated using the standard allowances (father: € 400,000; grandfather: € 200,000; uncle: € 
20,000; friend: € 20,000) and tax rates in the respective tax classes. Additional pension allowances could be granted and 
would reduce the effective tax rates further 
.  
Vignette characteristics 
Effective tax rate 
(tax payment/total 
acquisition) 
Tax rate (§ 19 ErbStG) 
(tax payment/taxable 
acquisition) 
Proposed inheritance tax 
rate (PITR) 
Lump-sum bequest of € 





Lump-sum bequest of € 





Lump-sum bequest of € 





Lump-sum bequest of € 








Lump-sum bequest of € 







Lump-sum bequest of € 
25,000 from uncle 
3.0% 15.0% 14.8% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
100,000 from uncle 
16.0% 20.0% 16.6% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
500,000 from uncle 
24.0% 25.0% 19.2% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
1 mil from uncle 
29.4% 30.0% 20.9% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
10 mil from uncle 
34.9% 35.0% 24.2% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
25,000 from friend 
6.0% 30.0% 16.5% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
100,000 from friend 
24.0% 30.0% 18.3% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
500,000 from friend 
28.8% 30.0% 20.9% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
1 mil from friend 
29.4% 30.0% 22.6% 
Lump-sum bequest of € 
10 mil from friend 
49.9% 50.0% 25.8% 
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Figure 1: Vignette example. The varying dimensions used in our design are embolded. 
 
Mr. Miller inherits a family enterprise valued at € 100,000 from his uncle. His monthly gross 
income is € 1,750. The governmental debt of the country he lives in is currently high. 




Figure 2: Distribution of proposed inheritance tax rate, PITR (dependent variable) 
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